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Abstract 
The present study extends Fanti, Gori, 2012 (L. Fanti, L. Gori, 2012. The dynamics of a differentiated duopoly with quantity 
competition, Economic Modelling, 29, 421-427).  In this study we investigate the dynamics of a nonlinear discrete-time duopoly 
game with differentiated goods, linear demand and quadratic cost functions. The game is modeled with a system of two 
difference equations. Existence and stability of equilibria of this system are studied. We show that the model gives more complex 
chaotic and unpredictable trajectories as a consequence of change in the parameter of horizontal product differentiation and a 
higher (lower) degree of product differentiation (weaker or fiercer competition) destabilize (stabilize) the economy. The chaotic 
features are justified numerically via computing Lyapunov numbers and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Also, we 
show that in the case of quadratic costs there are stable trajectories and a higher (lower) degree of product differentiation does not 
tend to destabilize the economy.  
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1. Introduction 
An Oligopoly is a market structure between monopoly and perfect competition, where there are only a few number 
of firms in the market. The dynamic of an oligopoly game is more complex because firms must consider not only 
the behaviors of the consumers, but also the reactions of the competitors i.e. they form expectations concerning how 
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their rivals will act. Cournot, in 1838  has introduced the first formal theory of oligopoly. He treated the case with 
naive expectations, so that in every step each player (firm) assumes the last values that were taken by the 
competitors without estimation of their future reactions. In particular, we consider differentiated products and focus 
on the dynamic role played by the degree of horizontal product differentiation. While Cournot 1838  considered a 
duopoly with a single homogeneous product, more recently the economic literature offered duopoly models with  
(horizontal) differentiated products (see, e.g., Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984) which allow goods and services 
to be substitutes or complements, in models with a standard linear demand structure.  
Expectations play an important role in modelling economic phenomena. A producer can choose his expectations 
rules of many available techniques to adjust his production outputs. In this paper we study the dynamics of a 
duopoly model where each firm behaves with different expectations strategies. This kind of beliefs is common in 
real world problems such as economic, biology and social sciences problems. We consider a duopoly model where 
each player forms a different strategy in order to compute his expected output. We take firm 1 to represent a 
boundedly rational player while firm 2 has naive expectations. Each player adjusts his outputs towards the profit 
maximizing amount as target by using his expectations rule. Some authors considered duopolies with homogeneous 
expectations and found a variety of complex dynamics in their games, such as appearance of strange attractors 
(Agiza, 1999, Agiza et al., 2002, Agliari et al., 2005, 2006, Bischi, Kopel, 2001, Kopel, 1996,  Puu,1998).  Also 
models with heterogeneous agents were studied  (Agiza, Elsadany , 2003, 2004, Agiza et al., 2002, Den Haan , 
20013, Fanti, Gori, 2012, Tramontana , 2010, Zhang , 2007).  
The main result of the present analysis is that the proposition of Fanti Gori, 2012, is not true if the cost function 
is quadratic.  In this case there are trajectories of the system in which an increase in product differentiation may 
destabilize the unique Cournot–Nash equilibrium, but we show that in this case there are stable trajectories and a 
higher (lower) degree of product differentiation does not tend to destabilize (stabilize) the economy. Moreover, from 
a mathematical point of view, we show that the destabilization of the fixed point can occur through a flip bifurcation 
and also that a cascade of flip bifurcations may lead to periodic cycles and deterministic chaos.  
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the dynamics of a differentiated duopoly game with 
heterogeneous expectations, linear demand and quadratic cost functions is analyzed. The existence, local stability 
and bifurcation of the equilibrium points are also analyzed. In Section 3 numerical simulations are used to show 
complex dynamic via computing Lyapunov numbers, and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. 
2. The game 
2.1. Construction of the game 
In oligopoly game players can choose simple expectation rules such as naïve or complicated as adaptive 
expectations and bounded rationality. The players can use the same strategy (homogeneous expectations) or can use 
different strategy (heterogeneous expectations). In this study we consider heterogeneous players such that each 
player think with different strategy to maximize his output. Two different players expectations are proposed; 
bounded rational player and naive player.  We consider a simple Cournot-type duopoly market where firms (players) 
produce differentiated goods and offer them at discrete-time periods t = 0, 1, 2, … on a common market. At each 
period t, every firm must form an expectation of the rival’s output in the next time period in order to determine the 
corresponding profit-maximizing quantities for period t+1. If x (resp. y) is the quantity of product of variety 1 (resp. 
2), the inverse demand functions (as a function of quantities) are given by the following equations (Fanti, Gori, 
2012) 
 
 1 2,  ,   p a x dy p a y dx  (1) 
We suppose that the cost functions are quadratic: 
 2 21 2( ) ,  ( )C x cx C y cy  (2) 
where a, b , c >0,  -1 < d < 1.  
d represents the degree of horizontal product differentiation. More in detail, if d=0, then goods and services of 
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variety 1 and 2 are independent. This implies that each firm behaves as if it were a monopolist in its own market; if 
d=1, then products 1 and 2 are perfect substitutes or, alternatively, homogeneous; 0 < d <1 describes the case of 
imperfect substitutability between goods. The degree of substitutability increases, or equivalently, the extent of 
product differentiation decreases as the parameter d raises; a negative value of d instead implies that goods 1 and 2 
are complements, while d = −1 reflects the case of perfect complementarity. With these assumptions the profits of 
the firms are given by  
 
 2 21 2( , ) ( ) ,  ( , ) ( )x y x a x dy cx x y y a x dy cy  (3) 
Then the marginal profit at the point ( , )x y  of the strategy space is given by 
 
 1 22(1 ) , 2 (1 )a c x dy a y c dx
x y
 (4) 
and 
 
 2 10 ( )
2(1 )
y a dx
y c
 (5) 
We suppose that the first firm decides to increase its level of adaptation if it has a positive marginal profit, or 
decreases its level if the marginal profit is negative (bounded rational player) and the second is a naïve player. If k > 
0, the dynamical equations of the players are: 
 
 1 2
( 1) ( )
,  y(t+1) argmax ( ( ), ( ))
( ) y
x t x t
k x t y t
x t x
 (6) 
The dynamical system of the players is described by 
 
 
( 1) ( ) ( )[ 2(1 ) ( ) ( )]
1
( 1) [ ( )]
2(1 )
x t x t kx t a c x t dy t
y t a dx t
c
 (7) 
We will focus on the dynamics of the system (6) to the parameterd . 
 
2.2. The Equilibria  of the game 
The equilibria of the dynamical system (7) are obtained as nonnegative solutions of the algebraic system 
 
 
( )[ 2(1 ) ( ) ( )] 0
1
( ) [ ( )]
2(1 )
kx t a c x t dy t
y t a dx t
c
 (8) 
which obtained by setting ( 1) ( ),  y( 1) ( )x t x t t y t  in Eq. (7) and we can have two equilibriums 
0 (0, / 2(1 ))E a c and 
* * *( , )E x y , where 
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 * *y
2(1 )
a
x
c d
 (9) 
The fixed point 0,E is the boundary equilibrium. The equilibrium 
*E is called Nash equilibrium.  The study of the 
local stability of equilibrium solutions is based on the localization on the complex plane of the eigenvalues of the 
Jacobian matrix of the two dimensional map (Eq. (7)). In order to study the local stability of equilibrium points of 
the model (7), we consider the Jacobian matrix ( , )J x y  along the variable strategy( , )x y  
 
 
11 2 (1 )
( , )
0
2(1 )
k kx c kdx
xJ x y
d
c
 (10) 
 
The matrix  
 0
1 [ ] 0
2(1 )( )
0
2(1 )
ad
k a
cJ E
d
c
 (11) 
  
 has two eigenvalues: 
 1 20, 1 1 2(1 )
d
ka
c
 (12) 
It follows that 2 1 , and then 0E is unstable fixed point for the system (7). The Nash equilibrium 
*E is locally 
stable if the following conditions are hold (Gandolfo, 2010) 
 
 
( ) 1 0
( ) 1 0
( ) 1 0
i D
ii T D
iii T D
 (13) 
where T is the trace and D is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix 
 
* *
*
1 2 (1 )
0
2(1 )
( )
k c x kdx
d
c
J E  (14) 
Since  
 
2
*1 1 0
2(1 )
kd
D x
c
 (15) 
and 
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*
1 [2(1 ) ][2(1 ) ] 0
2(1 )
kx
T D c d c d
c
 (16) 
 
The conditions (i) and (ii) of Eq. (13) are always satisfied and then the condition (iii) is the condition for the local 
stability of the Nash equilibrium. This condition becomes 
 
 2 24(1 ) 4(1 ) (2 ) 0akd c d c ak  (17) 
The discriminant of Eq. (17) is positive if an only if  
 2 2 216(1 ) [ ( ) 2 1] 0 ( ) 2 1 0 (0,1 2)c ak ak ak ak ak  (18) 
It follows that Eq. (17) is verified if and only if 
 
1 2
(0,1 2)
( , )
ak
d d d
 (19) 
Where  
 
2
1,2
4(1 ) 1 ( ) 2 1
2
c ak ak
d
ak
 (20) 
the two real roots of Eq. (17). 
It follows that: 
Proposition.  The Nash equilibrium of the dynamical system Eq. (7) is locally stable if and only if 
  
1 2
(0,1 2)
( , )
ak
d d d
 (21) 
3. Numerical Simulations 
We show that the model gives more complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories as a consequence of change in 
the parameter of horizontal product differentiation and a higher (lower) degree of product differentiation (weaker or 
fiercer competition) destabilize (stabilize) the economy. To provide some numerical evidence for the chaotic 
behavior of the system Eq. (7), as a consequence of change in the parameter d we present various numerical results 
here to show the chaoticity,  including its bifurcations diagrams, strange attractor, Lyapunov numbers and sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions (Kulenovic, M., Merino, O., 2002). In order to study the local stability properties of 
the equilibrium points, it is convenient to take 
 
 1 210,  0.2 0,  2(1 ) 1a k d d c  (22) 
Numerical experiments are computed to show the bifurcation diagram with respect to d, strange attractor of the 
system Eq.(7) in the phase plane (x,y) and the Lyapunov numbers . Fig. 1 show the bifurcation diagrams with 
respect to the parameter d. In this figure one observes complex dynamic behavior such as cycles of higher order and 
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chaos. Fig. 2 show the graph of strange attractor and Lyapunov numbers of the orbit of (0.1, 0.1) for k = -0.98. From 
these results when all parameters are fixed and only d is varied the structure of the game becomes complicated 
through period doubling bifurcations, more complex bounded attractors are created which are aperiodic cycles of 
higher order or chaotic attractors.  
To demonstrate the sensitivity to initial conditions of the system Eq.(7), we compute two orbits with initial 
points (0.1, 0.1) and (0.101, 0.1), respectively. Fig. 3 shows sensitive dependence on initial conditions for x-
coordinate of the two orbits, for the system Eq.(7), plotted against the time with the parameters values a = 10, k = 0.2, 
d = -0.98. At the beginning the time series are indistinguishable; but after a number of iterations, the difference 
between them builds up rapidly. From Fig. 3 we show that the time series of the system Eq. (7) is sensitive 
dependence to initial conditions, i.e. complex dynamics behaviors occur in this model. 
We observe that a higher degree of product market differentiation may destabilize the unique Cournot–Nash 
equilibrium, while also showing the existence of deterministic chaos. This result suggests a twofold effect: while an 
increase in the extent of product differentiation tends to increase profits, it may also cause the loss of stability of the 
equilibrium through a flip bifurcation. 
If 
 
 1 210,  0.1,  1 4(1 2) 1,  4(1 2) 1a k c d d  (23) 
From Eq. (21) for each d in the interval (- 1, 1) the Nash equilibrium * 10 10,
4 4
E
d d
 is locally 
asymptotically stable (Fig. 4). Therefore, in the case of quadratic costs there are stable trajectories and a higher 
(lower) degree of product differentiation does not tend to destabilize (stabilize) the market.  
 
 
           
 
 
Fig.1. Bifurcation diagrams with respect to the parameter d against variable x (left) and against y (right) for a =10, k= 0.2, with 550 iterations of 
the map Eq. (7). 
 
                  
152   Georges Sarafopoulos /  Procedia Economics and Finance  19 ( 2015 )  146 – 153 
 
Fig.2. Phase portrait (strange attractor) with 2000 iterations of the map (left) and Lyapunov numbers versus the number of iterations (right), of the 
orbit, orb. (0.1, 0.1), for a =10, k = 0.2, d = - 0.98 
 
 
                    
 
 
Fig.3. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, for x–coordinate plotted against the time: The two orbits orb.(0.1, 0.1) (left) and orb.(0.1, 
0.101) (right), for the system (6), with the parameters values a = 10, k = 0.2, d = -0.98. 
          
 
                
   
 
Fig.4. Bifurcation diagrams with respect to the parameter d against variable x (left) and against y (right) for a =10, k= 0.1, with 550 iterations of 
the map Eq.(7). 
4. Conclusion 
We show that the parameter of horizontal product differentiation (for some values of the others parameters) may 
change the stability of equilibrium and cause a structure to behave chaotically. For some values of this parameter 
there is a stable Nash equilibrium. Decreasing these values, the equilibrium becomes unstable, through period-
doubling bifurcation. Also, we show that in our case of quadratic costs there are stable trajectories for each d in the 
interval (-1, 1), and a higher (lower) degree of product differentiation does not tend to destabilize the market.  
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